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Abstract 
 
This paper reviews some main studies on fossil fuel extraction under climate issues 
and studies a theoretical model of monopoly extraction under pollution stock ceiling 
constraint. We show that under constant elasticity demand and zero extraction cost, 
the monopolist will behave exactly the same as in the competitive case, and the 
existence of the ceiling constraint will initially push the extraction to grow at a rate 
higher than the interest rate in both monopoly and competitive case; With a non-zero 
extraction cost the monopoly may be under lower risk to be affected by the ceiling 
than the competitive case; With a constant non-zero cost, which can be either 
extraction cost or abatement cost, the comparison monopoly versus competitive 
market is identical to the comparison “social optimum with high cost” versus “social 
optimum with low cost”. 
 1
Introduction 
 
The environmental problems caused by combustion of fossil fuels are directly connected to 
what we’ve already heard a lot: global warming. Global warming plays a major role in 
causing severe weather events around the world, which happens continually recent years and 
causes both human and economic loss. The threats posed by global warming, such as 
hurricanes, typhoons, tornadoes, blizzards, droughts, floods and other catastrophes, are 
becoming harder and harder to ignore. Polluting the atmosphere could be a key factor in 
increasing temperatures around the world. Greenhouse gases, of which carbon dioxide are of 
high abundance, generated largely by combustion of fossil fuels, trap sun’s heat in 
atmosphere and have been linked to rising global temperature. Renewable energy is not 
replacing fossil fuels as quickly as scientists have been forecasting, people are consuming 
more and more oil, coals…every year. Behind the high speed economic development is the 
danger of overpolluting, which when accumulated to certain amount will cause irreversible 
environmental tragedies.  
 
“The Stern review on the economics of climate change” is a 700-page report released on 
October 2006 by economist Lord Stern, which discussed the effect of climate change and 
global warming on the world economy. Estimating the overall effects from the cost side, the 
review calculated that the dangers of unabated climate change would be equivalent to 5% of 
the world GDP each year, yet the costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to avoid the 
worst impacts of climate change could be limited to around only 1% of global GDP each 
year. And if we don’t take action, “the overall costs and risks of climate change will be 
equivalent to losing at least 5% of global GDP each year, now and forever”. In other words, 
reducing emissions to tackle with climate changing would make us better off. As the most 
widely studied and discussed report in climate change and economic development, the Stern 
report significantly drew the world’s attention to the issues of climate change. Focusing on 
the cost side, the review couldn’t make it clearer that climate change could have serious 
impacts on human development, and if we take action now, there is still time to avoid the 
worst impacts to happen. 
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The European Economic Advisory Group Report (2008) on the European economy pointed 
out that to find useful policies to control carbon emissions, not only the cost side, but also 
the supply side must be considered, because supply reactions in carbon markets were 
fundamentally different from that in normal markets for the simple reason that the stock of 
carbon in the ground is exhaustible and can’t be reproduced. To date the public climate 
policy discussion has been focused on the reduction of demand for fossil fuels. However, 
demand reducing measures such as emission permits and the subsidization of alternative 
energy sources risk being ineffective or even counterproductive without proper analysis from 
supply side. 
 
Classical studies in exhaustible resource extraction, started from Hotelling (1931), have been 
mainly focused on the optimal allocation of the resource under finite supply over time 
horizon. Based on the classical Hotelling model, a two state variable dynamic with pollution 
externality has been developed since the 1990s and the dynamic has been maintained in 
recent studies which combine climate policy into the control process. Most recent studies on 
fossil fuel extraction under climate policies assume perfectly competitive market, while the 
monopoly case hasn’t yet been specifically studied. However, the geographic nature of the 
stock of fossil fuels such as oil makes its supply market more likely to be monopolistic than 
perfectly competitive, as is the truth for the world oil market today. 
 
This paper studies a simple case of monopoly extraction under a pollution stock ceiling and 
compares that with a competitive market. The results show that under constant elasticity 
demand and zero extraction cost, the monopolist will behave exactly the same as in the 
competitive case, and the existence of the ceiling constraint will initially push the extraction 
to grow at a rate higher than the interest rate in both monopoly and competitive case; With a 
non-zero extraction cost the monopoly may be under lower risk to be affected by the ceiling 
than the competitive case; With a constant non-zero cost, the comparison monopoly versus 
competitive market is identical to the comparison “social optimum with high cost” versus 
“social optimum with low cost”. 
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The remainder of this paper develops as follows: Chapter 1 briefly reviews the classical 
Hotelling theory on nonrenewable resource extraction. Chapter 2 reviews some earlier 
studies on fossil fuel extraction that included the pollution externality into the model. 
Chapter 3 reviews some recent studies on the fossil fuel extraction under climate policy. 
Chapter 4 initiates a study on the monopoly extraction under pollution stock ceiling with 
constant elasticity demand and zero extraction cost, and briefly extends the discussion to the 
case when there exists constant non-zero cost. 
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Chapter 1 Classical Hotelling theory on non-renewable resource 
extraction 
 
The optimal extraction of non-renewable resources, mainly fossil fuels, is one of the main 
branches in resource economics. Optimal control theory is extensively applied in the area to 
solve for the optimal path of the resource extraction over a time horizon. Hotelling (1931) 
characterizes the beginning of the era for the study of exhaustible resource extraction. In a 
typical Hotelling model of optimal extraction, the resource rent, or the marginal profit of 
extracting, grows at a rate that equals the discount rate. Define  as the market price 
received and 
tP
tR  as the amount extracted at time . The time variable is dropped where 
convenient. The inverse demand function is given by 
t
( )P P R= . In a perfectly competitive 
market, the social utility function is defined by 
0
( ) ( )
R
U R P dτ τ= ∫ . With zero extraction cost, 
the social planner aims to maximize the total utility of all periods: .
0
max ( ) rtU R e dt
∞ −∫ 1 The 
current stock of the resource is defined by , which is the state variable of the control 
problem. The rate of change of the resource stock is given by 
tS
tS
•
tR= − , where R  functions 
as the control variable. The current value Hamiltonian ( )H U R Rλ= − . From the first order 
condition ' ( )U R λ=  and the time derivative for the costate variable rλ λ• = , one can get 
P r
P
•
= . If given an initial price ,  fixes the relative prices for the resource at 
different times. The total stock of the non-renewable resource is given by . Suppose the 
resource is exhausted at time .
0P 0
rt
tP P e=
0S
T 2  
       
1If the resource is exhausted at a finite time , then T ( ) 0U R =  for t T . ≥
2For the resource to be optimally exhausted at a finite time, the price at zero demand must not be 
infinitely high. The resource is exhausted in infinite time if (0)P = ∞ . 
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0P  and T  can be co-determined by ( ) 00 0T T rtoRdt f P e dt S= =∫ ∫  and , 
where 
( )0 0rTTR f P e= =
1( ) ( )f P P P−=
( ) ( )Y R rY R
•
=
. 
 
Following the same procedure, for a monopolist who is supposed to maximize the total profit 
 of all times, the optimal path will be such that the marginal profit grows at a rate 
that equals the interest rate , that is, ' ; Under non-zero extraction cost for 
both social planner and the monopolist, the optimal path will be such that the net marginal 
profit grows at a rate of . 
Y PR=
r '
r
 
The Hotelling’s model describes a single state variable optimal control problem, which aims 
to obtain the optimal path that maximizes the objective function under the exhaustion 
constraint. The nature of difference in optimal paths for competitive market and monopoly is 
that the objective functions differ in the two cases. For competitive market the objective 
function is the social total utility, while in monopoly case it is the total profit. Since 
Hotelling’s study, the optimal resource extraction problems have been studied dynamically, 
as it should be due to the scarcity nature of the non-renewable resources. The optimal control 
theory is the mathematical basis for studies in the area.  
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Chapter 2 Fossil fuel extraction with pollution externality 
 
Dynamic exhaustible resource extraction study is incomplete without taking into 
consideration of continues development of society and human being. “The economics of 
climate change and the economics of exhaustible resources could not be more closely 
intertwined, for in essence the problem of global warming is the problem of gradually 
transporting the available stock of carbon from underground into the atmosphere, with useful 
oxidization on the way.”(Sinn (2007))  
 
For the last decades, the study of exhaustible resource extraction has been extended from the 
classical Hotelling exhaustible resource model to models with environmental concerned 
aspects. In most of those studies, environmental damages caused by the consumption of 
exhaustible resources, mainly fossil fuels, were modeled as a loss of the social welfare. This 
negative externality that causes pollution to the environment from burning fossil fuels was 
included in the objective function in form of a damage function. Define Z  as the stock of 
pollution in the atmosphere. Since carbon dioxide is the main greenhouse gas, Z  is also 
referred to as carbon stock. Assume competitive market, a general model in the fossil fuel 
extraction with pollution externality can be described as follows: 
( )
0
max ( ) ( ) ( )
. .
0
rtU R C R D Z e dt
s t S R
Z aR bZ
R
∞ −
•
•
− −
= −
= −
≥
∫
 
The social utility function  is assumed to be concave. ( )U R ( )C R  is the cost function. 
 is the damage function of pollution stock, which is assumed to be increasing and 
convex.  is the polluting emission proportion from consuming 
( )D Z
a R  unit of fossil fuels, and 
b is the natural regeneration parameter of the atmosphere. The time horizon is set to be 
infinite. Under a concrete demand function, if the resource is exhausted at a finite time , 
then  for t . 
T
0R = T>
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One of the main challenges of solving this control problem might be technical. Problem 
arises as a result of the fact that the extraction amount also controls the path for the growth 
of the stock of pollutants. Withagen (1994) made it clear that an optimal control problem in 
the presence of stock externality as modeled in the above is a two state variables control 
problem. He generally studied the extraction path for exhaustible resource in the presence of 
negative externalities by including a damage function of stock pollution, employing optimal 
control theory for two state variables. He employed the above model where . He 
compared the optimal extraction path when the pollution is causing damage with that when 
there is no pollution externality. The current value Hamiltonian would then become: 
( ) 0C R ≡
( ) ( ) ( )H U R D Z R aR bZλ μ= − − + − . He compared the first order Hamiltonian with that 
where . By doing so he showed that the initial extraction amount ( ) 0D Z ≡ 0R  would be 
less than in the case of no negative externalities, and the two extraction paths intersect at a 
certain time point, the resource would be depleted at a lower rate than without pollution 
externality. Withagen (1994) is an early attempt in solving for the optimal exhaustible 
resource extraction in the presence of pollution externality. An important result from his 
work is that the initial extraction would be less than without externality in order to balance 
the pollution damage caused by the consumption of the resource.  
 
Ulph and Ulph (1994) extended the study of the path for carbon tax with pollution 
externality and studied the effort of the pollution externality on the dynamic of carbon tax. 
They generalized the usual stock externalities analysis to allow the resource that generated 
the pollution be exhaustible. If we define the benefit function in Ulph and Ulph’s model as 
the total social welfare, their study is in fact equal to the study of exhaustible resource with 
pollution externality. The Hamiltonian of the control problem will then be: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )H U R C R D Z R aR bZλ μ= − − − + −  
where the costate variable μ  is defined as the optimal carbon tax. Ulph and Ulph assumed 
a special case where benefit and damage functions were in quadratic form and showed that if 
the initial pollution stock was small, the carbon tax would be rising first and then falling 
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until exhaustion. Carbon tax is a regulating tool for the control of carbon emissions by policy 
makers. They pointed out from the study that it was the time structure of the carbon tax 
rather than its level that would have an influence on the optimality.  
   
Hoel and Kverndokk (1996) modeled the exhaustibility of the resource differently. They 
used a stock dependent marginal cost function, ( )C S , and from the optimality they showed 
that the optimal carbon tax would be increasing at the beginning and then start to decrease 
before the carbon stock reached the maximum point. This result is consistent with that of 
Ulph and Ulph (1994). In addition, they related the behavior of the optimal carbon tax to the 
evolution of the carbon stock in the atmosphere and showed that the behavior of the carbon 
tax over time would depend on the initial growth of the carbon stock in the atmosphere. 
They pointed out that the carbon tax started to decline at a time before the carbon stock 
declined, and would continue to decline. That is, when μ  begins to decline, it is only 
possible for Z  to either also begin to decline or continue to increase before it declines. 
 
The running of industries in modern society is largely reliable on the use of fossil fuels. 
Since it is not realistic to solely reduce energy use, scientists and policy makers are trying to 
find solutions for a possible transmission from highly polluted fossil fuels to less polluted or 
clean energy source. A clean backstop can provide the ideal energy substitute without 
polluting the atmosphere. However, due to limited techniques, the extraction cost of such a 
clean backstop might be much higher than fossil fuels. The substitution of fossil fuels and 
possible backstop technology is thus also a concern in the study of fossil fuel extraction with 
pollution externality. 
 
Possibilities for substitution may affect the original path in certain ways. Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz (1981) had a discussion on how a future date when possible new technology appears 
would change the rate of depletion of the exhaustible resource. They studied the competitive 
market case, and showed that if the date of this new technology was uncertain, the rate of 
extraction ought to be chosen in such a manner that the resource stock keeped positive as 
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long as the innovation had not occurred. Both cases when the amount of resource is large 
and small are considered. When the resource stock is large, the initial depletion rate is slower 
in most cases. This is an earlier study on the effect of possible backstops, assuming the 
substitute only appears in an uncertain future time instead of being available from beginning.  
The substitute, also referred to as backstop technology, when available in unlimited 
quantities can be clean energies such as solar and wind power, hydropower, nuclear power, 
which already exist. Instead of possibly being found in some future time, those known 
backstop energy are available initially when the extraction path is planned. In the existence 
of such non-polluting backstop technology, Hoel and Kverndokk (1996) made a comparison 
of the extraction path of fossil fuels with greenhouse externalities with that without 
externalities. The extraction paths will be of same pattern for with and without externalities, 
yet with externality the extraction will be slower. Also, in the existence of greenhouse 
externality, it would be optimal for consumer to consume both fossil fuels and the backstop 
when the price of fossil fuels reaches the price of the backstop. This result is different from 
classical backstop theories, where the resource is depleted until the price reaches the cost of 
the backstop, and the consumers will switch to backstop at that price immediately.  
 
Part of Tahvonen (1997)’ results also showed that instead of a clear cut out of fossil fuels and 
the backstop, there might be simultaneous use of both in certain conditions as a result of the 
stock externality. The substitution of fossil fuels and the backstop under pollution externality 
was extensively studied in Tahvonen (1997). He used the common way to model the 
backstop technology. Define  as the backstop consumption, and  the constant 
marginal cost of the backstop. Including the consumption of the backstop into the objective 
function, the model can be written as follows: 
Q ( 0)≥ m
( )
0
max ( ) ( ) ( )
. . , 0
rtU R Q C R mQ D Z e dt
s t S R R
Z aR bZ
∞ −
•
•
+ − − −
= − ≥
= −
∫
 
Tahvonen first showed what the paths were like for carbon tax, pollution stock and resource 
extraction under a given initial pollution stock 0Z . When 0Z  is low enough, the carbon tax 
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and the pollution stock have inverted U-shaped paths, while resource extraction decreases 
monotonically towards zero; With 0Z  high enough, the carbon tax and the pollution stock 
converge monotonically towards zero, while the resource extraction first increases and then 
decreases towards zero. These results showed the connection among the time paths for 
carbon tax, stock pollution and resource extraction. He showed the paths’ dynamics was 
affected by the initial level of stock pollution, which was neglected in most works.  
Later on he showed the possible combination of consuming fossil fuels and the backstop. 
Define  as the optimal backstop use when Q∗ 0R = , Q∗  satisfies . He 
showed there were three regimes for optimal use of the resource and the backstop: 
(1) ; (2)  and (3)
' ( )U Q m∗ =
0,Q R Q∗= > 0, 0Q R≥ ≥ , 0Q Q R∗= = . The optimal resource consumption 
strategies could be a combination of the three regimes. As can be seen in regime (2), the 
consumption of both resources is positive, meaning the fossil fuels and the backstop energy 
can be simultaneously used. These combination uses of energies can’t happen in the case 
where there are no pollution externalities.  
 
A main challenge for studying pollution externality could be that it is empirically difficult to 
measure the exact damage function, and as a result the studies are done rather through 
general theoretical analysis than empirical modeling.  
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Chapter 3 Fossil fuel extraction under climate policy 
 
The Kyoto Protocol Treaty, which was negotiated in 1997 at Kyoto, Japan and came into 
force in 2005, is an international agreement linked to the United Nations framework 
convention on climate change (UNFCCC). The Kyoto Protocol is generally seen as an 
important first step towards a truly global emission reduction regime. It sets binding targets 
for industrialized countries and the European community to reduce their collective 
greenhouse gases by an average of five percent against the year 1990 level over the period 
2008-2012. (If compared to the emissions level that would be expected by 2010 without the 
Protocol, this target represents a 29% cut.) 
 
On one hand, the issue of global warming is seeking more and more attentions. The impact 
of global warming on the world economy has been studied in a wide range, among which the 
Stern report is the most influencing one. The report pointed out that it was high time for 
human beings to take action against global warming. Although, unlike most studies that 
emphasize the urgency of global warming, Chakravorty, Roumasset and Kinping (1997) used 
empirical simulation in a multi resource and multi demand model and showed from the 
results that the issue of global warming might be overstated. They used empirical data to do 
a simulation on the use of energy substitutions under the concern of global warming. They 
generally extended the study of fossil fuel extraction and global warming into a situation 
with alternative regimes of technology change. In reality, except solar energy, the other clean 
energies are in fact also exhaustible. And instead of homogenous demand for a single 
resource, there may be simultaneous use of different fossil fuels for diverse demands in 
different industry areas. Their analysis also indicated that the transition to backstop 
technology might be the only viable solution to the threats of global warming.  
 
On the other hand, recent studies of non-renewable resource extraction have been focused on 
the optimal path under the climate policy, which for example can be a climate policy such as 
the Kyoto Protocol. The characteristic of these studies is that the damage function is 
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excluded from the model, and a upper limit on the pollution stock is added. This can also be 
seen as a special case of a convex damage function, where the damage function is zero until 
it goes to infinity at the time the stock pollution reaches the ceiling. The typical model 
studied is as follows: 
( )
0
max ( ) ( )
. .
0
rtU R C R e dt
s t S R
Z aR bZ
R
Z Z
∞ −
•
•
−
= −
= −
≥
≥
∫
 
Given the initial stock of pollution 0Z , the cumulative pollution is not allowed to exceed the 
ceiling Z  that is set by the policy maker.  
Assume there is only one resource and the extraction cost is zero. The Hamiltonian is 
( ) ( ) ( )H U R R aR bZ q Z Zλ μ= − + − + −  
Following Chakravorty, Moreaux and Tidball (2006)’s results, when 0Z Z= , the ceiling will 
be binding for a non-zero time from the beginning, and after the binding period the price 
path is growting as in the Hotelling path. When 0Z Z< , that is, the initial stock pollution is 
lower than the ceiling, the pollution stock rises from 0Z  to Z , while the price path follows 
a non Hotelling path, and after the ceiling is binding for a non-zero time, the path is again 
pure Hotelling. The existence of the ceiling will result in the price path not develop as the 
traditional Hotelling path.  
 
Chakravorty, Moreaux and Tidball (2006) also extended the situation to that with the 
existence of imperfect polluting resource substitutes. They assumed there simultaneously 
existed one high cost (for example natural gas) and one low cost (for example coal) 
nonrenewable resource. They showed that it might be efficient to extract the more polluting 
yet lower cost resource like coal first, then natural gas and finally again coal. The pattern of 
the extraction would be dependent upon the initial endowment of the two resources. If the 
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stock of coal is relatively low, then the Hotelling rents of the two resources are exactly equal 
and regulation is never binding. If coal is abundant, it has a lower Hotelling rent than natural 
gas. With abundant resources, “extraction paths have a turnpike feature in which both 
resources are jointly extracted at the maximum allowed level.” Chakravorty, Moreaux and 
Tidball (2006) can be considered as a first step towards the understanding of the affects of 
the environmental regulation on the extraction of non-renewable resources. 
 
The substitution of fossil fuels and non-polluting backstop energy under stock pollution 
ceiling was extended in Chakravorty, Magné and Moreaux (2006) to the case of 
non-stationary demand and abatement activity. They assumed two resource, polluting coal 
and clean solar energy. In addition they assumed that carbon emissions could be abated at 
constant unit cost, such as through sequestration by forests or pollution reduction at source. 
Assuming an exogenous stock pollution ceiling, they studied the price paths under stationary, 
increasing and decreasing demand for coal and solar energy in perfectly competitive market. 
Their results showed that abatement took place only at the ceiling. In all cases, coal is used 
exclusively in the initial period. The stock of pollution builds up over time, followed by an 
interval in which the ceiling is binding. After that the stock pollution declines to zero 
gradually. 
 
Besides the backstop technology, public policies may also be efficient tools to mitigate the 
problem of global warming. Such policies “must succeed in flattening the carbon supply in 
the world energy market” (Sinn (2007)). Sinn pointed out that useful policies would include 
public finance measures to flatten the supply path, safer property rights, binding quantity 
constraints and technical means to decouple the accumulation of carbon dioxide from carbon 
consumption. Sequestration is useful but difficult in reality due to the large quantities 
involved. This might indicate a very high abatement cost for the abatement activity 
suggested in Chakravorty, Magné and Moreaux (2006).  
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Chapter 4 A model of a resource monopoly under pollution stock 
ceiling 
 
4.1 Monopoly and the climate policy 
 
So far, most studies have assumed the fossil fuels being produced in competitive market. 
However, in the world oil market, monopoly may an extreme but alternative assumption. 
 
The Organization of the Petroleum Counties (OPEC) plays as the biggest Cartel in the world 
oil market. OPEC has the considerably strong power in controlling the oil output and price in 
the international market. Recently years the world oil price keeps fluctuating, the United 
States is in a recession and much of the rest of the world faces an economic slowdown. If we 
see the world oil market as a big monopoly, then not only the world economy is greatly 
influenced, the pollutions caused by the production and consumption of oil is in high time to 
be regulated. The monopolist will then be limited from freely extracting the polluting 
resource under a regulation that set restriction on emission. In the case of oil market, 
government usually has the power to set the level of production and price, and therefore 
functions as a policy maker.  
 
Take the oil market in China as an example. On July 2008, developing nations led by China 
and India rejected a proposal by G8 leaders to tackle climate change. The plan would see 
greenhouse gas emissions cut by 50% by 2050. As a matter of fact, oil is defined as a 
strategic resource in China. In spite of the release of Measures for the Administration of the 
Refined Oil Market and Measures for the Administration of the Crude Oil Market on January 
1, 2007, foreign and private oil companies still face an oil market in China that is dominated 
by massive monopoly. Before, the refined oil market was controlled by China National 
Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) and China Petroleum & Chemical Corp. (Sinopec), and the crude 
oil was distributed collectively by the government. “As major suppliers of oil, CNPC and 
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Sinopec enjoy absolute control over the Chinese refined oil market due to the comprehensive 
operational and sales network they have established through years of monopoly.”3 The 
opening of the wholesaling market does not mean that the supervision by the government 
will be loosened. Oil companies cannot price oil freely. The price is set by the government 
who when decides the price needs to take consideration of many aspects, therefore the 
state-owned companies, which have absolute control over domestic oil sources, would be 
unlikely hit hard by the more competitive sort market.  
 
One big concern in setting oil price for the government would be a responsibility in 
responding to climate change. The article by Gørild Heggelund (2007) demonstrates that 
prospects for emission reduction are not realistic under the current policy environment, and 
China is unlikely to take on commitments in the near future. However, China is now an 
active participant in the Clean Development Mechanism and is seeking to find a way to 
balance the emerging climate changing with economic development.  
 
From truth of the oil market, monopoly is still a big topic in the world resource extraction 
and economics development. This is also true when it takes the form of local monopoly, as is 
the case in China. Although in reality the oil market rather take the form of oligopoly and 
monopolistic extraction, it is usually convenient to start from the extreme assumption of pure 
monopoly case. Most of the literature that study fossil fuel extraction under climate policy 
have assumed competitive market and almost none has specifically studied how a climate 
policy set to regulate the pollution may affect monopoly extraction. 
 
 
 
 
 
3http://www.bjreview.com.cn
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4.2 The basic model: 
 
Consider the monopoly case with a single non-renewable resource. The initial time  is 
defined as the time when the policy is announced to the producer. Before this time, the 
extraction path would not be restricted by additional constraint and would follow the 
traditional Hotelling rule. Correspondingly,  in the model studied will then be the 
amount of resource stock available at the time 0, therefore  is actually the total stock of 
the fossil fuel minus the amount that has been extracted before the time the policy is 
announced. 
0t =
0S
0S
0Z  is the stock of pollution when the policy is announced at time 0, and 0R  is 
the endogenous initial extraction amount at time 0t = . 
 
Suppose the policy maker knows the “natural peak” of the stock of pollution, which is the 
maximal amount of carbon stock under the Hotelling path without a ceiling constraint. He 
will then set the ceiling somewhere below this natural maximal amount. 4 At time  the 
owner of the resource is aware of the ceiling constraint. If instead of taking action to adjust 
the extraction path, the producer still follows the previous Hotelling path, by the time the 
pollution stock reaches the ceiling, he will face a sudden cut down of extraction amount in 
compliance to the policy. In fact the extraction would then be cut down to such a level that 
the growth rate of the stock pollution 
0t =
tZ  equals zero. Such a kink in the extraction amount 
will lead to a sudden cut down of the objective utility or profit as well, and thus will not 
maximize the objective utility or profit function since optimization requires concavity and 
continuity of the objective function. 
 
 
4A policy is effective only when the ceiling is set below the natural maximal pollution stock. Here the 
initial available fossil fuel is supposed to be abundant enough so that the emissions of carbon dioxide will 
potentially cause environment problems, which makes it necessary to set a climate policy. 
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Consider a demand curve with constant demand elasticity, the inverse demand function is 
denoted by , (1P Rα−= 0 1α< < ), where 1
1 α−  is the elasticity of demand. In the case of 
monopoly, the elasticity of demand is assumed to be greater than 1. Since 
10 1
1
α α< < ⇒ >− 1, 
the assumption is satisfied.  
 
At time  a total stock of the resource  is available, and the stock of carbon dioxide 
in the atmosphere is known as 
0t = 0S
0Z . Let tZ  represent the stock of pollution in the 
atmosphere at period , and t Z  be the ceiling on the pollution stock imposed exogenously 
by the regulator. An amount of tR  units of fossil fuel is extracted at period . Let  be 
the amount of resource stock available at time , so the equation of motions for the resource 
stock can be written as . The stock of resource decreases over time, indicating the 
scarcity of the non-renewable resource.  
t tS
t
tS
• = − tR
t
 
Assume the carbon emission of the fossil fuel is proportional to its amount of consumption, 
this proportion is denoted by . The atmosphere has a natural capability of recovering 
from pollution, let  denote the nature regeneration capacity parameter of the 
atmosphere that is proportional to the stock of pollution. At time , the growth rate of the 
pollution stock is given by 
( 0)a >
( 0)b >
t
t tZ aR bZ
• = − . Furthermore, during the period when the ceiling 
is binding, , thus0t t tZ aR bZ
• = − = bR Z
a
≡ . The extraction amount keeps at the level of 
b Z
a
 until the binding ceases.  
 
Consider the policy is set to control the pollution stock to “never exceed Z  in future time”, 
indicating tZ Z≥  for . In the optimal path under the ceiling constraint there will be a 
time 
0t >
1θ  when the pollution stock reaches the ceiling, the ceiling is binding until time 2θ , 
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later on the stock pollution will decline as time goes to infinity. 1θ  and 2θ  are endogenous. 
Define  as the profit function for monopoly, ( )Y R ( )Y R PR Rα= = . Assume a constant 
marginal cost . Interest rate is . The monopoly problem is to maximize the total net 
profit given resource and pollution constraints. The control problem is as the following: 
c r
( )
0
max
. .
0
0
0
rt
t t
t t t
t
t
t
R cR e dt
s t S R
Z aR bZ
Z Z
R
S
α∞ −
•
•
−
= −
= −
− ≥
≥
≥
∫
 
The model is an optimal control problem with one control variable R  and two state 
variables  and S Z . Compared with the model in Chakravorty, Magné and Moreaux 
(2006), this model can be seen as a very specific case where both clean backstop energy and 
abatement activities are not considered.  
 
The constraint  requires that the extraction amount keeps positive during all periods. 
This condition is automatically satisfied due to the isoelasticity characteristic of the demand 
function. The demand curve goes infinitely to X-axis and Y-axis but never reaches. Thus R, 
no matter how close to zero, will never really reach zero. Therefore the resource will be 
exhausted in infinite time. Another constraint  indicates the current stock of the fossil 
fuel must not go negative. This is also satisfied by the equation that the total extraction in all 
period is equal to the initial stock, that is, 
0tR ≥
0tS ≥
0
0
t tR d S
∞
=∫ . 
 
Current value Hamiltonian is defined as:  
( )H R cR R aR bZα λ μ= − − + −  
The sufficient conditions for a maximum are that the Hamiltonian function be concave in the 
control variables and the state variables. Since here  is a combination of concave H
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functions, it is concave in . ( , , )S Z R
The Lagrangian is given by: ( ) (L R cR R aR bZ q Z Zα λ μ= − − + − + − )  
Necessary conditions for optimality are: 
( )
1
0
0
0( 0 0)
rt
t
L R c a
R
Lr r e
S
Lr r b q r b
Z
q q if Z Z
αα λ μ
λ λ λ λ λ
μ μ μ μ μ
−
•
•
∂ = − − + =∂
∂= − = ⇔ =∂
∂= − = + + = + +∂
≥ = − >
q
 
 
The necessary transversality conditions at infinity are presented a bit differently in some 
similar studies. The study in Withagen (1994), for example, deals with one control variable 
and two state variables problem when one of the state variables, the pollution stock, is also 
involved in a damage function that is included in the objective function. He described the 
necessary condition for optimality on the costate variable μ  for pollutant stock as 
 (lim ( ) 0t
t
e tρ μ−→∞ = ρ  has the same meaning as  in the models discussed here). Hoel and 
Kverndokk (1996) when studying the greenhouse externality problem added a necessary 
condition 
r
lim ( ) 0rt
t
e tλ−→∞ =  on the costate variable λ  for the resource stock. The situation 
studied here is different from the above studies in that only the control variable appears in 
the objective function that is to be maximized.  
 
Borrowing from Kamien and Shwartz (1981), the complete conditions at infinity for a 
current value infinite horizon control problem, using notations in the models above, are as 
follows:5 
lim ( ) 0rt
t
e tλ−→∞ ≥ ,  lim ( ) 0rtt e tμ−→∞ ≥
lim ( ) 0rt tt e t Sλ−→∞ = ,  lim ( ) 0rt tt e t Zμ−→∞ =
 
5These conditions are also referred to as transversality conditions at infinity. 
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Chakravorty, Magné and Moreaux (2006) useed the latter two conditions. 
 holds since 0lim ( ) lim 0
rt
t
e tλ λ−→∞ = > 0 0λ > , the costate variable for resource stock must be 
positive. The stock of the resource goes to zero at infinity, lim 0tt S→∞ = , it thus can be shown 
that . Chakravorty, Magné and Moreaux have shown 
that 
0 0lim ( ) lim lim 0
rt
t t tt t t
e t S S Sλ λ λ−→∞ →∞ →∞= = =
tμ  after the binding time is actually zero. This is because after the binding period, the 
ceiling will not play any role in controlling the extracting process, thus the problem goes 
back to that without ceiling constraint. tμ  declines to zero when the binding period ends. 
Therefore, since ( ) 0μ ∞ = , lim ( ) 0rtt e tμ−→∞ =  and lim ( ) 0rt tt e t Zμ−→∞ =  are also satisfied. 
 
In the path under ceiling, at an endogenous time point 1θ  the pollution stock is binding at 
the ceiling that is set by the policy. The ceiling keeps binding until a time 2θ .  is only 
satisfied during this binding period 
0q >
1 2( , )θ θ . 0q =  for 1t θ<  and 2t θ> . At time 1θ , the 
amount of carbon stock in the atmosphere reaches the regulated maximal Z , its growth rate 
0Z aR bZ
• = − ≡  until the binding ends. Meanwhile bR Z
a
≡ , the extraction amount keeps 
at this same level b Z
a
 from the beginning to the end of the binding period. During the 
other two periods when the ceiling is not binding, 1(0, )θ  and 2( , )θ ∞ ,  when ( )0 r b tt eμ μ +=
10 t θ< < ; 0tμ =  for 2t θ> . In addition, 0μ <  for 2t θ< . The absolute value of μ  
must be increasing and then decreasing to zero at time 2θ . 
 
 
4.3 When extraction cost is zero 
 
Consider a simple situation where 0c = . Stiglitz (1976) showed that under stationary, 
constant elasticity demand and zero extraction cost, the extraction path in the monopoly case 
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is identical to that in the competitive case. This is because under the constant elasticity 
demand and zero cost, the marginal profit of the monopoly is proportional to price, thus the 
optimal marginal rate and price both grow at the rate of , which is exactly the same as in 
competitive case. 
r
 
The social utility function is defined by 
0
1( )
R
U R Pd Rατ α= =∫ . Compared with he profit 
function for monopoly, ( )Y R Rα= , it is easily seen that ( ) ( )Y R U Rα= . Now with same 
exhaustibility and ceiling constraints, the social planner maximizes , while 
the monopolist maximizes: .  
( )
0
( ) rtU R e dt
∞ −∫
( ) ( ) ( )
0 0 0
( ) ( ) ( )rt rt rtY R e dt U R e dt U R e dtα α∞ ∞ ∞− −= =∫ ∫ ∫ −
 
The first order conditions for Lagrangian in both monopoly and competitive cases are: 
0L p
R
α λ μ∂ = − + =∂ , t tp tα λ μ= − , in addition rλ λ
• = , r bμ μ• μ= +  when the ceiling is 
not binding. Take derivative one can get ( ) ( )p r r bα λ μ λ μ μ• • •= − = − − , so p br
p
μ
λ μ
•
= − − . 
0λ > , and 0μ <  as pollution is a “bad”, so 0bμλ μ <− , thus 
p r
p
•
> . 
 
It can be shown that ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
U R Y R P br
U R Y R P
μ
λ μ
• • •
= = = − −  . For both the monopoly and the 
competitive case, the price paths are identical. The reason for this is that the same optimal 
path would maximize a function as well as the same function that is multiplied by a 
parameter, thus in the existence of ceiling constraint, the monopoly and competitive behavior 
are also identical under constant elasticity demand and zero extraction cost assumption. As is 
shown, with a ceiling constraint, the price grows at a rate of 
r>
br μλ μ− − , which is higher than 
, for both monopoly and competitive case. In the existence of the “maximal stock pollution 
policy”, resource is depleted more rapidly than otherwise in the beginning period until the 
r
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ceiling is binding. When the binding period stops, μ  equals zero, the price will grow at a 
rate of  as it is in the case without ceiling constraint. r
The path for the pollution stock under ceiling constraint would differ from the “natural 
growth” when no restriction is added on pollution stock. Since 0 0t 0Z aR bZ
•
= = − , the 
comparison of the initial growth rate for pollution stock is the same as the comparison of the 
initial extraction amount. The higher 0R  is, the faster the stock of pollution grows initially. 
Consider two extreme cases: if 0Z Z= , the ceiling is binding from the beginning and stock 
of pollution declines gradually after binding ceases; if Z  is equal to the natural peak of the 
stock pollution, the two paths of Z  with or without ceiling constraint are identical. The 
idea can be shown in figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1  Paths for the pollution stock when 0Z Z=  and when naturalZ Z=  
 
Denote .0
M CR  as the initial extraction amount for the monopoly case, or equally, the 
competitive case, without ceiling constraint. As time 0 is assumed to be the time when the 
policy is announced, the path before time 0 may already lead to an extraction amount when 
reaching time 0. Suppose here at time 0 the plan is reconsidered with or without ceiling 
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constraint, regardless of the previous path. In the case of no ceiling constraint, the 
reconsidered path will still be smoothly consistent with the previous path. The reason for this 
is that if a whole path is optimal for the entire horizon, then a section of the path still 
optimizes the objective function in the corresponding horizon section.  
 
Denote .0
M CR  as the initial extraction amount for both monopoly and competitive cases 
under ceiling constraint. Since the path is exactly the same for monopoly and for competitive 
market, take the monopoly case for instance. Without ceiling constraint, first order condition: 
, together with 1 0Rαα λ− − = 0 rteλ λ −=  one can get 
1
0 1( )
rteR αλα
−
−= . Thus 
1
. 0 1
0 ( )
M CR αλα
−= . 
 
Using the resource scarcity: 0
0
t tR d S
∞
=∫ 10 1 00 ( )
rte dt Sαλα
∞ −⇔ =∫ 10 1 1 001( ) ( )
rt
e S
r
α αλ α
α
∞
− −−⇔ Ι = , 
( 1 0α − < ) .0 01
M C rR Sα⇔ = −   
With a ceiling constraint, first order condition is given by: 
1
1 10 ( t tt t t t
aR a Rα αλ μα λ μ α
− ) −−− + = ⇔ = . 
For 10 t θ< < , , (1) ( )0 r b tt eμ μ μ += =
1 1( )1
(1) 0 01 1( ) ( )
rt r b t
t
e a eaR R α αλ μλ μα α
+
− −−−= = = ; 
For 1 2tθ θ< < , (2) ( ) ( ) ( )0( ) ( )r b t r b t r b tt t t tr b q e e e q t dtμ μ μ μ μ
• + + − += + + ⇔ = = + ∫ , 
 bR Z
a
≡ ; 
For 2t θ> , 0tμ = , 
1 1
(3) 01 1( ) ( )
rt
t
eR R α αλλα α
− −= = =  
Through the horizon, 0
rt
t eλ λ=  
The initial extraction amount can be written as: 
1
. 0 0 1
0 ( )
M C aR αλ μα
−−=  
In the binding period 1 t 2θ θ< < , the extraction amount keeps at the same level b Za . This 
indicates that the rate of growth of R  during the time must be zero, that is: 
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1 20 ( 1) 0 ( )t tr a r b aqR a R R a
α αα λ μ α α λ μ• • •− −− + = ⇔ − = − = 0tλ μ⇔ − + − =  
From this together with 1( )b Z a
a
αα λ− = − μ , one can get the expression of  as a function 
of 
q
0λ  as: 
1 1
0( ) ( )
rt
t t
r b b b r b b bq Z Z
a a a a a a
α α eα λ α λ− −+ += − = −  
The dynamics of the stock of pollution: 0 ( )
bt bt bt
tZ aR bZ Z Z e e e R t dt
• − −= − ⇒ = + ∫ . 
There are four unknown parameters, 1 2 0 0, , ,θ θ λ μ  which can be determined by the following 
four equations: 
1
2
1 3
2 10
( )b 0R dt Z R dt Sa
θ
θθ θ
∞+ − + =∫ ∫  
Left continuity of tR  and tZ : 
1
1
( )t
bR Z
aθ=
=  
2
3
( )t
bR Z
aθ=
=  
1( )t
Z Zθ= =  
The initial extraction . .0 0 0 0( , , )
M C M CR R S Z Z=  
Compared with .0 1
M C r
0R Sα= − , two situations may happen:  
If .0 0
.M C MR R< C , the stock of pollution grows slower in the beginning than without ceiling 
constraint, and after binding period declines gradually (shown in figure 2a); Denote the 
initial price of 0P  when the resource is extracted without ceiling restraint. The initial price 
is higher than 0P  (shown in figure 3a). 
If .0 0
.M C MR R> C , the stock of pollution grows faster initially, and in a shorter time reaches 
the ceiling, after binding time gradually declines (shown in figure 2b), and the starting price 
is lower than 0P  (shown in figure 3b). 
As has been shown before, with ceiling constraint, the price before binding time will grow at 
a rate higher than otherwise at the rate , and after the binding time goes back to traditional 
Hotelling case where price grows at the rate of . 
r
r
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Di Maria and Werf (2008) have proved in a situation with one non-renewable resource and 
backstop available, “an announced emissions constraint cannot lead to an increase in 
emissions in the period between announcement and implementation”.6 However, constraint 
on emissions and constraint on accumulated pollution stock are two different kinds of 
policies. Whether the ceiling constraint will lead to an initially higher or lower growth rate of 
the pollution stock than without ceiling constraint, depends on the ultimate value of 
.
0 0 0( , , )
M CR S Z Z  as discussed above, which is not explicitly solved here. 
 
 
 
figure 2a  Paths for the stock pollution with and without ceiling constraint when 
. .
0 0
M C MR R< C .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
6See Di Maria and Werf (2008) section 6, Proposition 2 and Appendix B.2 for proof. 
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figure 2b  Paths for the stock pollution with and without ceiling constraint when 
. .
0 0
M C MR R> C  
 
 
 
 
figure 3a  The price paths with and without ceiling constraint when . .0 0
M C MR R< C  
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figure 3b  The price paths with and without ceiling constraint when . .0 0
M C MR R> C  
 
 
4.4 The announcement and implementation of climate policy 
 
When studying the effect of climate policy and the corresponding extraction path that is 
adjusted due to the regulation, the time of the announcement and the implementation of the 
policy are important to know in first place. Quantitatively, the accumulated amount of 
greenhouse gas in the atmosphere should not exceed the ceiling Z  from the time of 
implementation. The policy maker can when set the ceiling Z , requiring the pollution stock 
to “never exceed Z  ” or to “not exceed Z  from a time point, say, year 2010”. And in the 
latter case, it might make a difference that this time point is year 2010 or year 2100. 
Basically, the longer the period is from the announcement to the implementation, the more 
time is given to firms to prepare and adjust the production schedule.  
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The announcement effort is a new topic in the literature. So far only a few papers have 
investigated the effects of announced climate policy. Kennedy (2002) argues that the policies 
on emission reductions may be costly and inefficient during the period between 
announcement and implementation. Smulders and Werf (2007) show in the case of two 
resources, high and low in content of carbon, that the announcement of an emission 
constraint at a future date immediately causes a drop in the extraction rate of high carbon 
resource and a rush on resources that will be used less after implementation, which is 
contrast to the case without announcement when the both emissions and output jump the 
instant the constraint is introduced. Di Maria and van der Werf (2008) initiate a study on the 
effect of announcement on emissions of carbon dioxide, when an economy is facing a 
constraint such as the Kyoto Protocol. They have shown that when two perfectly 
substitutable fossil fuels are available, one high in carbon and the other low-carbon, 
announcement of the climate policy might have two opposite effects: it might reduce a 
policy burden since the pre-announcement has given firms time to adjust. Yet the 
announcement might cause an immediate increase in carbon dioxide emissions. So far the 
announcement effort of pollution stock constraint hasn’t been specifically studied. 
 
Under the same assumptions as the model discussed previously, suppose when announcing 
the ceiling constraint the policy maker also set a time for enforcement: the pollution stock 
must not exceed Z  from, say, time θ . Assume the time at which the pollution stock equals 
an amount Z  when there is no ceiling constraint is 1θ
∧
 and 2θ
∧
.  
 
If θ  is set at time 2θ
∧
 or after, then it does not affect the original path at all and there 
would be no binding time, the path for stock pollution will be exactly the same as when there 
is no ceiling constraint.  
 
If θ  is equal to 0, the implementation comes into force the moment it is announced, and the 
result will be the same as in the previously discussed model, where price grows at a faster 
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rate than otherwise  in the Hotelling path, because if it is not so, as has been explained 
previously, there would be a sudden jump or drop down in the extraction amount, such kink 
in the extraction path will contradict the continuity requirement for maximum. At time 
r
1θ  
the pollution stock reaches the ceiling and keeps binding until 2θ , then gradually declines 
afterwards. 
 
If θ  is set between 0 and 2θ
∧
, it might happen that the resource owner produces from very 
high amount initially and extracts the resource even faster, because during the time period 
(0, )θ  he is not restricted by the ceiling constraint. Whether doing so will actually maximize 
his profit is not studied here. The idea is shown in figure 4. The solid line represents the path 
without ceiling constraint and with ceiling constraint when policy maker sets the 
implementation time 2θ θ
∧≥ . The dashed line represents the optimal path under ceiling 
constraint for 0θ = . The dotted line represents the possible path when 20 θ θ
∧< < . 
 
 
  
figure 4  Possible paths for the pollution stock with different implementation time  
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Notice that the climate policy here allows an initial increase in carbon stock and require it to 
not go beyond a level that is higher than the initial stock pollution in future, that is, 0Z Z≥ . 
This is by nature different from when the policy is aimed to stabilize the carbon stock at a 
lower level than the initial stock pollution from at a future time, which in reality is the target 
of Kyoto Protocol. 
 
A very particular case would be the ceiling is binding from the very beginning  when 
it is announced. Smulders and Werf (2007) have shown that if this is true in a situation with 
both high carbon and low carbon resources, then the constraint will not bind forever since 
stock resources, from which emissions stern, are depleted over time. Here we study a single 
resource without substitute resource. If the ceiling is binding initially, 
0t =
1 0θ = , .0M C bR Za= , 
and the optimality conditions actually becomes two unknown parameter 0 2,λ θ  satisfying 
the following equations: 
 
2
2 0( ) t
b Z R dt S
a θ
θ ∞+ =∫  
2
2
1
0 1( )
r
t
e bR Z
a
θ
αθ
λ
α
−= = =  
The optimal time for stopping binding the ceiling is solved as: 
0
2
1aS
rbZ
αθ ∗ −= +  
The result has a similar form of that solved by Smulders and Werf, except that in latter case 
there are two initial stocks of fossil fuels. The optimal stop time for binding depends 
negatively with the ceiling Z . The higher the ceiling is, the short time it takes to stop 
binding.  
 
Generally, under constant elasticity of demand, when the extraction cost is zero, the 
monopoly extraction path is identical with that of the perfect competitive case. The existence 
of the pollution stock ceiling will result in both monopoly and competitive case that price 
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grows at a higher rate than the discount rate otherwise. The initial growth rate of the 
pollution stock could be either higher and lower than the natural pollution stock growth, due 
to the fact that the initial extraction amount compared with no ceiling constraint situation, is 
to be determined by the initial pollution and the maximal ceiling in addition to the stock of 
the resource. This is also the reason that the initial price could also be both higher and lower 
than without ceiling constraint. 
 
 
4.5 When there is constant positive marginal extraction cost 
 
Comparing with the monopolist, the social planner is aiming to maximize a total net social 
utility, which equals the consumer surplus minus the extraction cost. Control problem for 
competitive case: 
0
1max
0
0
0
rt
t t
t t t
t
t
t
R cR e dt
S R
Z aR bZ
Z Z
R
S
α
α
∞ −
•
•
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
= −
= −
− ≥
≥
≥
∫
 
 
Recall that Hotelling (1931) demonstrated that with a constant marginal extraction cost, the 
optimal path would be such that the price minus marginal cost rises at the rate of discount in 
the competitive market, and marginal revenue minus marginal cost (resource rent) rises at 
the rate of discount in a market of monopoly.  
 
When extraction cost is taken into consideration, monopoly and competitive paths would 
differ from each other. Stiglitz (1976) showed that with extraction cost, the monopolist 
would bias to behave more conventionally, that is, the extraction would grow at a lower rate 
than the social optimal in the beginning. Following this result, the paths for monopoly and 
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competitive extraction and the relative pollution stock change are shown in figure 5a and 5b. 
Without ceiling constraint, the monopolist will take the conventional policy, the extraction 
rate will be lower than in the competitive case. Since the initial extraction amount of 
monopoly is lower, the stock of pollution in monopoly case will grow in a lower rate initially 
than that of competitive case. The same level of ceiling that functions in competitive case 
may not make effect in monopoly case. So with a ceiling constraint, it might be binding in 
the competitive case but not in the monopoly case if the ceiling is, although lower than the 
natural cap of competitive case, still above the monopoly natural cap. 
 
 
figure 5a  Comparison of extraction paths for monopoly and competitive market  
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figure 5b  Comparison of paths for stock pollution in monopoly and competitive market 
 
 
4.6 Comparison monopoly versus competitive market 
 
Notice that the constraints are same for both the monopoly and the competitive. The 
objective function for monopoly: 
1. ( c )R cR R Rα αα α α
⎛ ⎞− = −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ .  
While the social objective function is 1 R cRαα − , where c is the positive constant marginal 
cost.  
The monopoly and the competitive paths would be again the same if the cost for monopoly 
is α  time the cost in competitive case, that is, 
1 1 1. ( ) . ( ) .
M C
M Cc cR c R R R R R R c Rα α α ααα α αα α α α α
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− = − = − = −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
 
But in reality, the cost for the social and monopoly would be same under the same 
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technological conditions. Suppose the costs are same for social and monopoly case. The 
objective functions for monopoly and social optimum are: 1. ( c )R Rαα α α
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  and 
1 R cRαα
⎛ −⎜⎝ ⎠
⎞⎟ 1 respectively. Since 0 α< < , the comparison of monopoly and social 
optimum is identical to the comparison of “social optimum with high cost” and “social 
optimum with low cost”. That is, moving to monopoly from a social optimum is equal to 
moving to social optimum with low cost from social optimum with high cost 
 
This cost can be the extraction cost. It can also be seen as the constant unit abatement cost. 
The carbon stock in the atmosphere can be reduced through costly abatement. Suppose there 
is a positive constant unit abatement cost, the higher this abatement cost is, the more costly it 
is to reduce the carbon emission through abatement activities.  
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Conclusions 
 
This paper reviews some main studies on fossil fuel extraction under climate issues and 
studies a theoretical model of monopoly extraction under ceiling constraint. So far almost 
none research has been done dealing with the effect of a climate policy on a resource 
monopoly. Our results show that under constant elasticity demand and zero extraction cost, 
the monopolist will behave exactly the same as in the competitive case, and the existence of 
the ceiling constraint will initially push the extraction to grow at a rate higher than the 
interest rate in both monopoly and competitive case; With a non-zero extraction cost the 
monopoly may be under lower risk to be affected by the ceiling than the competitive case; 
With a constant non-zero cost, the comparison monopoly versus competitive market is 
identical to the comparison “social optimum with high cost” versus “social optimum with 
low cost”. Furthermore, this cost can be both extraction cost and abatement cost. 
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